Reflections on a 'strategic' global strategy for the Union (B. Tonra)

Submitted by University College of Dublin on Wed, 10/07/2015 - 13:22

Should the Union’s new global strategy be more “strategic” in its orientation than its earlier “European Security Strategy”? I have my doubts.

The word ‘strategic’ appears to imply a world view in which rationally calculating unitary actors maximise their respective utilities, and where precisely defined and carefully calibrated preferences can be traded and exchanged.

This is a high bar.

It's a high bar for a unitary state and it's one that world's sole remaining superpower regularly fails to meet.

It is almost certainly an unreasonable goal for a multilevel, collegial 'actor' such as the Union.

It is not tenable to argue that we can bolt together the post-modern complexity of a multilevel structure of governance like the EU with the clarity of a modern, hierarchical, executive foreign policy actor that can be found in the modern nation state.

Thus, to embed the aspiration of 'strategic' into the fabric of the Union's new global strategy is, to my mind, to build failure into the very DNA of the Union's foreign policy.

Rather than strategic, I'd look to an 'intelligent' global strategy: one which defines the objectives to be achieved and specifies the means by which these are to be achieved.

The elements of an intelligent foreign policy are not alien to a so-called strategic approach – but they are arguably better framed to the needs of the Union and its member states. An intelligent foreign policy would be grounded in specific, measurable and attainable goals with the broad range of integrated EU policy tools placed at the disposal of national and EU policy actors. It would be based in more flexible decision making structures, allowing for various divisions of labour and some variable geometry in policy implementation.

An intelligent foreign policy would also set a high premium on a better understanding of our partners and competitors. To see the world as they see it – and yet NOT play the games that they wish to play. Whether these games are the medieval identity politics of the Middle East or the 19th century geo-political power plays of the current Russian administration, we should understand where these actors come from; their frames of reference and their ambitions/fears but we should work meticulously to our own agenda within our own value set and to our own interests.

This is a difficult endeavour: if we hold fast to our values and interests, then we will have potentially costly interactions outside our borders, but also perhaps difficult conversations within our Union in defence of human rights, justice and solidarity.

Pierre Vimont is quoted recently as arguing that the Union will soon have to deal with some issues that it has thus far ignored; such as what does the Union REALLY want to achieve with its Common Foreign and Security Policy and its Common Security and Defence Policy? This implies a more fundamental debate than ‘what do to in the event of crisis’. The 2003 Security Strategy – whatever its weaknesses and limitations in retrospect – clearly identified the Union as a potentially radical international actor; insisting that “spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights are the best means of strengthening the international order.” This time last year Sven Biscop called for a middle way between "dreamy idealism" and "unprincipled pragmatism". That is a tough triangulation for a polity such as the EU, but an intelligent global strategy would be a good start towards its realisation.

Our core ambition must be for a Union foreign policy that is – above all else – consistent, and most especially consistent with our values. Interests can be traded off one against the other; they can evolve as the material context in which they exist changes. Values, however, – while themselves not immutable – change more slowly and are linked more profoundly to our understanding of ourselves.

In the HRVP’s alliterative coda to her own review of EU security she highlights the need for a global strategy that is “common, comprehensive and consistent”. Of these, it is far and away more important that the Union be consistent – not simply in the tactical sense of policies working in tandem, but in sense of a consistency between policies and underlying values. With more flexible decision making, the Union’s foreign policy needs not always be ‘common’. Policy outliers can and should be accommodated on a case by case basis (thru abstention, opt outs and permanent structured cooperation). The Union also need not always be ‘comprehensive’ in that Union has visible strengths and weaknesses which will entail a sometimes differentiated policy response. The Union does, however, need to be consistent.

Consistency engenders credibility and clarity – both for international partners and for domestic publics. The price of consistency – in hard material interests – has also to be understood. But the price of inconsistency is far, far greater.