The New EU Global Strategy: Outline and Implications for Research and Teaching

Submitted by University College of Dublin on Thu, 04/28/2016 - 12:46

The forthcoming Global Strategy of the European Union will entail changes both to our understanding of the Union's foreign policy and our teaching of it. The recent annual conference of the EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) in Paris – and the keynote address of HR/VP Federica Mogherini – has underscored the extent to which we may need to adjust both.

The new strategy is explicitly ‘global’ in that it does not limit itself – as the 2003 and 2008 policy documents did – to consideration of ‘security’. It is designed, as the 2009 Lisbon Treaty reforms provided, to encompass the Union’s CFSP, CSDP and External Relations into a holistic strategy for the Union’s engagement with rest of the world. Having said that, there remains a strong security orientation to the strategy – but one which defines security in much broader and comprehensive terms.  Thus, there will be no detailed provisions on trade policy and development per se, even as these are frequently invoked as means by which the Union seeks to attain its international goals. So, what are these goals?

The team surrounding HR/VP Federica Mogherini has defined the Union’s global interests as being those of security, prosperity, democracy and a rule-based global order. For the HR/VP these interests are in no way to be seen in contradiction to the Union’s broader values but as deriving from them. Of course there are not many states in the international system that would disavow such broadly defined goals for themselves, even if these range across a spectrum of contested definitions. The Global Strategy, however, does put some specific flesh on these bones which may give rise to discussion among member states when they get sight of the final draft document. Moreover the strategy sets out in pursuit of these goals through arguably more EU-specific policy principles of engagement, responsibility, unity and partnership. Each of these are in turn expected to underscore the unique strengths and challenges that the Union faces in the construction of a common foreign policy among 28 sovereign states. In her formal address to the EUISS, the HR/VP made particular mention of the principle of unity, insisting that while the credibility and effectiveness of the Union rested on its capacity to marshal the policies of 28 member states, these states also enjoyed the benefits of magnifying and strengthening their individual global impacts through their membership of the Union.

Significantly, the HR/VP noted that an early priority in the implementation of the strategy – which she repeatedly insisted would be the real test of its relevance and efficacy – would be a ‘step-change’ in the development of the Union’s common defence policy. This was a change which she said was an eminently realisable goal, and which would encompass building the Union’s defence capacity. In this she drew particular attention to the need for much greater intelligence cooperation, better monitoring of hybrid threats, addressing cyber security and improved “strategic communications”. Within the overall foreign policy thrust, the HR/VP also drew attention to the need for the emerging policy to be credible, flexible & holistic – and she explicitly referenced the need to see the mainstreaming of human rights and gender into the Union’s foreign policy.

A theme that cut through the HR/VPs presentation, and much of the associated discussion, was the intersection between the external and the internal, i.e. the interrelationship between the Union’s domestic polity and its international capacity. For her part, the HR/VP insisted that the only existential crisis faced by the Union was that which came from within – rooted in a Union without effective solidarity, or in her words “a Union of free riders and lone warriors”. What she did not mention – but to which others drew attention – was the threat posed from domestic political forces which positively derided solidarity, which exploited nationalist tensions and which sought repeatedly to identify ‘the other’ as a source of threat or menace.

The teaching agenda which this throws up is potentially interesting. It certainly reinforces an approach which privileges a holistic approach to EU foreign policy, perhaps undermining the logic of CFSP-only courses and reinforcing the need to address EU foreign policy more thematically. It also arguably highlights the benefits of looking at the intersection of EU and national foreign policies in a more serious way, rather than in the traditional compartmentalized fashion with courses on national foreign policy juxtaposed against separate courses on EU foreign policy. Certainly, it underlines the need to give our students an appreciation of the unique working methods and structures which underpin EU foreign policy – and which perhaps do not easily lend themselves to the traditional ‘book and talk’ format of university courses. The added-value of role-play and simulations gives an immediate impression of the complexities surrounding EU-level foreign policy making and its impact on the construction of national foreign policies. Finally, and perhaps more broadly, it may lead us too to look more carefully at the democratic roots and legitimacy of EU foreign policy and the extent to which EU foreign policy does or does not respond to the ambitions of its citizens.

As a side note - and reflecting the ANTERO interest at the intersection of policy and scholarly analysis, it was notable the extent to which some policy makers assumed that part of the role of analysts and scholars was to bring the global strategy to the attention of the wider public. The assembled participants (drawn from among the EEAS and national diplomatic services and the think-tank/academic community) were repeatedly enjoined to disseminate the logic(s) underpinning the strategy.  For her part, the HR/VP spoke in very inclusive terms insisting that those engaged in the drafting of the strategy needed to hear the views of experts, of academia and of policy makers.  Others, however, seemed to assume that scholars had a responsibility to link publics to the specifics of the strategy’s goals and ambitions. It was a fascinating side-bar on the challenges faced by analysts seeking to get closer to the centre of policy making.

Ben Tonra

UCD Dublin

28 April 2016